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Abstract 
Early requirements definition is an increasingly complex process for systems that span 
organizational boundaries. Where there is no unequivocal rationale for change, multiple 
stakeholders from various knowledge domains must be involved in defining the scope of change 
and the high-level requirements for the supporting information system  –  in effect designing the 
system in terms of form and overall function. Stakeholders have only a partial understanding of 
the business process as a whole, and tend to provide very different definitions of what is the 
systems “problem” that they face. The IS analysis team must therefore deal with IS requirements 
as an emergent stream of information from which they learn, avoiding premature closure. This 
paper presents an exploratory study, that attempts to introduce breakdowns into the group 
requirements definition process, as a way to achieve emergent learning in early requirements 
definition for systems that span organizational boundaries. 
Keywords: Early requirements definition, boundary-spanning IS design, emergence, cross-
domain knowledge-sharing. 
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Introduction 
Early requirements definition is an increasingly complex process for systems that span organizational boundaries. 
Where there is no unequivocal rationale for change, multiple stakeholders from various knowledge domains must be 
involved in defining the scope of change and the high-level requirements for the supporting information system  –  
in effect designing the system in terms of form and overall function. Stakeholders have only a partial understanding 
of the business process as a whole, and tend to provide very different definitions of what is the systems “problem” 
that they face (Markus et al., 2002). The IS analysis team must therefore explore and reconcile incommensurate 
stakeholder perspectives and objectives for change. This paper presents an exploratory study of early requirements 
analysis for boundary-spanning information systems. We explore the processes of group problem-definition and 
resolution, employing a systemic approach to the analysis of such “wicked problems” (Rittel, 1972). We explore 
mechanisms for enabling a requisite variety of perspectives in organizational problem-solving (Weick, 1987) and we 
examine the role of cognitive breakdowns in this process (Winograd and Flores, 1986).  
Conceptual Background 
Early Requirements Definition For Boundary Spanning Information Systems 
It has been argued that complex systems to support boundary-spanning organizational processes are irreducible to 
the forms of data-processing model that are commonly used to explore early requirements for information systems. 
Such environments present major challenges in capturing and integrating knowledge from heterogeneous domains. 
As this is such a complex task, information systems to support boundary-spanning business processes should be 
conceived as emergent, with appropriate methods employed to support an “ecology of requirements,” that link and 
permit the evolution of relevant problem and solution spaces within the organizational environment (Bergman et al., 
2002). Several alternative approaches have been suggested to deal with this. A prototype-based approach, where the 
development of a joint artifact (a core information system) is facilitated and guided by IS professionals was 
suggested as a way of supporting emergent knowledge processes (Markus et al., 2002). An approach based on 
systems development agility, possibly treating the requirements specification as an emergent boundary-object to 
mediate between stakeholder knowledge-domains has been suggested as an alternative approach (Karsten et al., 
2001). Early requirements definition is a core part of an emergent design process, when the information system is 
complex and spans organizational, functional, or knowledge-domain boundaries (Bergman et al., 2002). Spiral 
approaches and prototyping present a pragmatic way of dealing with design complexity but they provide little 
insight into how a collective understanding of the organizational design problem unfolds.  
Early requirements analysis is the stage at which a form is determined for an IS design. The IT system is merely a 
supporting system to a wider information system that includes human beings engaged in purposeful action  –  the 
system of human activity (Checkland, 1981). If we take a systemic (as distinct from system-centered) view of IS 
design, an information system is designed by teams of information professionals acting in support of a variety of 
organizational stakeholder groups, mediating between their various interests and perspectives. The ideal role of the  
professional is that of process consultant rather than process expert  (Schein, 1990). There is a distributed 
understanding, across multiple stakeholders from different knowledge-domains, of what needs the information 
system must meet and what scope of change it will encompass, to meet what objectives. This is a classic “wicked 
problem”, where a set of interrelated problems are novel, subjective, only partially understood. We need to 
encourage a “symmetry of ignorance”, where everyone involved in the change is perceived as equally lacking in the 
expertise relevant to such a novel problem situation. In contrast, IT system development represents a classic “tame” 
problem, for which the definition of change goals and the subsequent definition of a design rationale and approach 
are unproblematic and well-understood. Wicked problems require design approaches that are based on 
argumentation, emergent problem representation, and goal-negotiation across stakeholder groups (Rittel, 1972). We 
may use a systemic approach to explore wicked problems. Of particular interest are those systemic approaches that 
encompass the analysis of human-activity systems, as these also focus on the multiple objectives and rationales 
pertaining to diverse subsystems of purposeful human activity within the organization. Soft systems methodology 
(SSM) focuses on the production of a diverse and integrated set of conceptual models that represent an ideal-world 
situation in which improvements to a problem-situation have been made. An effective set of changes may be defined 
by comparing the real-world situation with the ideal-world conceptual models. This approach has been employed for 
many years in action research and in information system requirements analysis to reconcile diverse stakeholder 
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perspectives. An additional benefit is that SSM actively supports stakeholder learning. This provides the basis for a 
more integrated and dynamic definition of high-level information system change requirements (Checkland, 1981). 
Traditionally, systems definition process focuses on problem reduction rather than exploration. We have a large 
amount of research evidence to indicate that methods are used selectively by IS professionals, who pick-and-mix the 
elements that fit with their prevailing mindset. This mindset delegitimizes problem inquiry and equivocality, 
emphasizing process control and coordination over effectiveness of the system design (Gasson, 1999). The majority 
of IS project management approaches consider exploratory problem inquiry to be indicative of “scope creep.” A 
systems development project is considered very high risk if the form and high-level scope and functions of the IS 
solution cannot be specified definitively during the early stages of requirements analysis (Karsten et al., 2001). IS 
professionals represent an exceptionally homogeneous interest group, the members of which are trained in 
normative engineering processes. These are designed to produce rapid, controlled problem closure and to minimize 
equivocality. Weick raises the harmful effect of homogeneity in his discussion of collective requisite variety: 
Where technical systems have more variety than a single individual can comprehend, one of the few ways 
humans can match this variety is by networks and teams of divergent individuals. A team of divergent 
individuals has more requisite variety than a team of homogenous individuals. … If people look for different 
things, when their observations are pooled they collectively see more than any one of them would see.  (Weick, 
1987, pp. 115-116). 
Although we may have effective techniques for the definition of early requirements in IS-related organizational 
change, we lack the means to ensure that the multiple change objectives and diverse rationales of various 
stakeholder constituencies are represented in an analysis process that is facilitated by a team of IS professionals. We 
need ways of producing a collective requisite variety of perspectives in the IS design team.  
The Process of IS Design 
In individual design processes, the form of the organizational IS required appears to result from the co-evolution of a 
mental “problem-spaces” (the individual’s understanding of the set of possible elements that, taken together, form 
the problem to be resolve) and a mental “solution space” (the individual’s set of candidate solution components, or 
patterns from prior experience that indicate how various parts of the problem might be solved). By constantly fitting 
an evolving understanding of a problem-space with an evolving understanding of a solution-space, the individual 
derives a working model of the problem-situation and how it should be changed at the same time (Dorst and Cross, 
2001). When solution sub-components are not available from the individual’s experience, or that of others 
(colleagues and contacts) upon whom the individual can call for aid in problem-resolution, the individual may 
reframe the problem to fit available solutions (Turner, 1987). The collective process may involve a co-evolution 
process, but its form is somewhat different than the individual process of design. Organizations are in a constant 
state of emergence and hence self-redefinition. Most organizations are “self-designing systems”, in that they 
constantly adapt to changing circumstances through improvisation. Organizations that find themselves incapable of 
such improvisation are less competitive and hence subject to dramatic failure (Weick, 2004). Conflicts may arise 
because there are multiple versions of organizational “reality” contending for acceptance during improvisation. 
Information systems designers must therefore design for “thrownness.” They are thrown into the middle of an 
ongoing process of organizational redefinition and emergence, where multiple views of reality compete in ways that 
have become familiar to the organizational managers and knowledge-workers upon whom change-analysts call, 
when defining the goals and detailed objectives of change. They are thrown into multiple existing and interacting 
systems of organizational improvisation and emergence (Winograd and Flores, 1986; Weick, 2004). When we speak 
of “requisite variety” in boundary-spanning design, it is of this variety of worldviews that we speak. We throw IS 
professionals, trained in reductionist IT system design methods into a situation where they must deal with a variety 
of organizational realities arising from different interest groups, each of which appears to have an equal claim to 
validity (Corbett, 1995). While they espouse a more improvisational theory of action, experienced professionals tend 
to privilege one stakeholder perspective over others, in order to reduce the problem-space to a manageable set of 
requirements for change (Gasson, 1999). When reciprocity dominates group learning, organizational change and 
design groups quickly develop sufficient coherence to support shared sensemaking (Boland and Tenkasi, 1995). But 
the ability to participate fully and on an equal basis in collective problem-solving or design is often determined by 
locally-defined perceptions of legitimate knowledge and expertise. What is valued in one context may not be 
deemed so in another. Our understanding of what constitutes legitimate practice and knowledge is largely formed by 
normative practice in local workgroups, through which we acquire our understanding of how to be competent in a 
particular profession (Lave and Wenger, 1991). Procedural work in engineering disciplines  –  including supposedly 
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“creative” work such as design  –   tends to be constrained by normative thinking that results from the formalisms 
and conventions of group apprenticeship (Rosenbrock, 1981). This “investment in form” of procedural 
bureaucracies and existing structures of action outweighs considerations of flexibility and adaptiveness as new 
requirements emerge (Latour, 1987; Star, 1992). An individual who suggests reconsideration is treated as a dissident 
and excluded rather than involved centrally in the ongoing process of design. To counter this tendency, an effective 
design process for novel IS must focus on complication, rather than reduction of the problem-space and solution-
space. We need to introduce the “symmetry of ignorance,” that was discussed above, where no one stakeholder 
group or individual can assert a claim to relevant expertise (Rittel, 1972). Group members must be equally involved 
in defining both the collective problem-space and the collective solution-space to achieve the desired requisite 
variety of problem and solution definitions for effective IS design.  
To this end, we may consider the role of breakdowns in a collective process of design. The centrality of breakdown 
in design is related to Heidegger's (1962) argument that objects and properties are not inherent in the world, but are 
simply  "ready-to-hand": unreflectively incorporated into automatic routines. A disconnect in the seamlessness of 
their use produces a breakdown. The artifact becomes visible in use, or "present-at-hand": the subject of reflection 
and redefinition (Winograd and Flores, 1986). Automaticity in use results from the individual’s experience of 
incorporating similar artifacts into one’s work-routines. When I am hammering in a nail I do not concern myself 
with the process of hammering, I just do it. When the hammer is too heavy for the nail or if the hammer breaks, I am 
forced to reflect not only on how the hammer is constructed, but also on the process of hammering-in-context  –  
how a hammer is used, in what circumstances certain hammer designs work, and why certain hammer designs fit 
with different types of hammering-process. As a result, I understand both hammer design and the process of 
hammering much more deeply, permitting me to select the right hammer for the job. So breakdowns may be 
productive in design. They force a disconnect in the assumptional flow, leading to a reexamination of design 
rationale and objectives. Extending the concept to group processes, it is possible that collective breakdowns hold the 
key to achieving requisite variety in boundary-spanning design. An early homogenization of problem perspectives 
can be harmful, resulting in premature specification  –  locking in the form and functions of the solution before the 
requirements for change have been understood. But premature specification occurs even when the method in use 
should sensitize group members to the multiple perspectives required for effective problem mediation. Groups of IS 
professionals trained in methods for rapid problem closure are highly homogeneous in their culture and focus. This 
paper explores mechanisms for disrupting that culture and focus productively, in early requirements analysis. 
Research Method 
The research design results from prior studies that found that group IS design cycles between a focus on problem 
inquiry and a focus on problem closure These studies concluded that the shift between an emphasis on problem 
inquiry and an emphasis on problem closure was brought about because of a collective breakdown that resulted from 
external stimuli or a redefinition of the project deliverable focus (Gasson, 1999, 2006). The study reported here 
was therefore designed to explore whether a redefinition of the project deliverable focus could bring about a 
productive form of collective breakdown  –  one that increased individual involvement in group decision-
making to increase the requisite variety of perspectives considered.  This paper presents an action research study 
(Baskerville and Wood-Harper, 1996). A College of Nursing was seeking ways to respond to this integration of 
technology, by integrating portable technology into their education and development programs. Increasingly, PDAs 
are used by nursing professionals in their daily work, to provide instant access to patient records, healthcare 
databases, and information about specific illnesses, treatments, and symptoms. The College wished to educate 
technology-illiterate students and faculty in the potential uses of portable technologies, by integrating PDA 
technologies into their educational curricula. This raised issues of the role that PDAs could play in the collection and 
delivery of confidential personal (patient), professional, instructional, and research information that had previously 
been delivered via highly-centralized systems of information technology.  
This study focused on the analysis of four groups of graduate students taking a course in early requirements analysis 
as part of a Doctoral or Masters Information Systems program. They were assigned to perform an early requirements 
analysis, investigating and suggesting solutions to this “wicked problem” (Rittel, 1972).  All groups analyzed the 
same problem-situation, with access to the same groups of problem stakeholders: faculty, nursing students, 
department administrators, technology support, information management, and program development administrators. 
All groups were required to use Checkland’s (1981) Soft Systems Methodology (SSM), supplemented with 
Wilson’s(2001) adaptation of SSM to integrate primary task perspectives of organizational goals. Although SSM 
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encourages the direct involvement of stakeholders in analysis, this was not feasible within a 10-week course 
schedule, with a focus on learning a completely novel (to the students) approach to early requirements analysis. Nor 
did stakeholders have the time or interest to be involved as participants. The selection of SSM as the core analysis 
method, coupled with assessment evaluation criteria that rewarded iterative stakeholder involvement,  ensured that 
students adopted the mediation role of process consultant rather than process expert  (Schein, 1990). All of the 
student participants had some professional IS development experience, ranging from 2 years to 18 years, with an 
average experience of 4 years. Their approach to group problem-solving could therefore be considered typical of the 
profession. There were two groups of four students and two groups of two students who provided sufficiently 
detailed data for the research study (see Table 1). While dyads are known to be more cohesive in their collaboration 
than larger groups, requiring less time and effort spent in communication and activity alignment, small groups that 
have an even number of members may be considered equivalent, as they do not suffer from the fragmentation 
common to odd-numbered groups where one person (or a minority) is disadvantaged by an alliance of the majority 
(Hare, 1981). The most significant effect on group cohesion may not be group size, but demographic fault-lines, 
especially sex, age, race, or occupational role. Groups that are evenly balanced between subgroups are likely to be 
similar in outcome, regardless of group size (Lau and Murnighan, 2005). In dynamic, high-uncertainty conditions, 
groups must develop interdependence mechanisms, coordinating activities, developing trust, and coming to rely on 
each other. Groups that perform well may be expected to both experience and report higher levels of cohesiveness 
(Myers and McPhee, 2006). This study examined whether this process of social inclusion can be managed to some 
extent by introducing discontinuities in the work-context to force breakdowns in group understanding of how to 
proceed. The instructional method was designed to provide disruptions to the normative thinking that dominates 
engineering disciplines (Rosenbrock, 1981). While all of the course participants were familiar with the relatively 
well-structured formalisms of systems analysis methods (and had experience of applying these in their 
organizational work), they were all equally unfamiliar with a systemic approach to early requirements analysis. They 
therefore shared a “symmetry of ignorance” (Rittel, 1972) regarding the analysis approach. This ensured that each 
group member had the potential to be equally involved in analyzing the IS “problem” and defining requirements for 
its solution. The course was designed around a term project with two equally-spaced deliverables. 
• The first project deliverable focused on systemic problem inquiry. It required each group to analyze competing 
human-activity system definitions and boundaries for change (Checkland, 1981). Groups were to produce a 
stakeholder analysis that summarized differences in perspective and to reconcile these into an integrated 
business process model that identified the “primary tasks” of the organization (Wilson, 2001). The objective 
was to summarize the relationship between competing change priorities, explore a consensus scope for change, 
and to identify alternative boundaries and subsystems of the organization that could provide the focus of 
change. The criteria for success were related to the diversity of perspectives, stakeholder-representativeness, 
and depth of analysis, applying SSM analysis techniques to explore interrelated problems that were separated 
out into distinct process goals and their required set of work-activities, suggested by various stakeholder groups. 
• The second deliverable focused on problem closure. Each group was required to provide a coherent solution to 
a prioritized subset of the human-activity systems modeled in the first half of the course. The group assignment 
was to investigate and model a stakeholder consensus on the reorganization of work (business processes, actors, 
and management roles), changes to the technical support systems, changes to reward systems and incentives, 
and a plan to implement the recommended changes. The explicit criteria for success were related to the depth 
and scope of the group’s integration of various stakeholder change perspectives, to produce a coherent set of 
requirements for both business process and IT system change. While the emphasis was on problem-closure, this 
was managed by providing explicit criteria that rewarded an integrationist rather than a reductionist solution. 
Table 1 summarizes the data collection and analysis approach employed for this study. The primary purpose of 
student papers and the instructor journal was to support a constructivist, reflective-learning approach to instruction 
(Schön, 1983), but these also provided an in-depth, week-by-week reflection of individual interpretations of IS-
related problems and solutions, and reported on how each individual saw their contribution to the group analysis. 
Combined with individual student interviews and surveys, the research design provided multiple sources of data, to 
triangulate and validate findings. Group process and individual involvement was assessed by means of a short 
questionnaire administered at three points in the course. Immediately following course completion, a critical 
incident analysis (Flanagan, 1957) was employed, with data gathered by means of individual interviews with group 
members. The analysis explored the group drivers and rationale at points at which the group changed or resolved to 
retain its definition of the problem or the solution space, or the group process used for early requirements 
investigation and definition. Critical incidents were self-reported (the most commonly-employed approach, 
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according to Butterfield et al., 2005). Interviews were conducted by a graduate student who had been trained in the 
critical incident technique, to remove instructor bias of student reports. Unsurprisingly, given the structured nature 
of an academic course, each group member reported on eleven sets of activity that were associated with the ten 
weeks of the course plus the final report and presentation to stakeholders. A detailed content analysis of interviews 
revealed that a coherent interpretation of changes in group direction emerged across all subjects in each group at 
specific points. Applying this definition of “critical incident” provided seven critical incidents for each group. These 
were identified with codes taken from participant accounts to avoid the imposition of an artificial categorization 
scheme, then categorized across groups. The episodes were not contemporaneous across groups, in that similar 
changes might occur one week earlier for one group compared with another, but they did appear to reflect similar 
types of changes across all groups. Several credibility checks were performed (Butterfield et al., 2005). Critical 
incidents for each group were categorized by two coders working independently, and then triangulated against the 
instructor observation journal. A content analysis of weekly reflection papers was triangulated against the interview 
findings and observations from the instructor journal, to provide a detailed and credible account of group processes. 
Table 1.  Data collection and analysis 
Source Frequency Analysis 
Interviews  to 
elicit critical 
incidents  
Post-hoc Critical incident categorization, validated across members of same group, followed by 
content analysis to determine congruence between accounts of how and why group roles 
or process changed, in defining the IS problem or solution. 
Instructor journal 
to record student 
& group process  
Weekly Content analysis of observations from facilitated meetings with student groups and from 
individual student interactions. Assessment of who did what and why. Also noted how 
much student appeared to feel that their perspective was appreciated by group as a whole. 
Student 
reflection papers 
Weekly Content analysis, to categorize student perceptions of group analysis goals and 
behavior, and the degree to which the student felt involved in decision-making. 
Participant 
questionnaires 
Start of 
course 
Self-assessment of prior knowledge and experience of systems requirements analysis, 
systemic or soft systems analysis. Findings triangulated with instructor journal. 
Participant 
questionnaires 
Mid-point 
& end 
Self-assessment of how much individual feels that their perspective is included in group 
decision-making. Report of who did what, for each course deliverable. 
Stakeholder 
project 
evaluation  
End of 
course 
Two “client” stakeholders provided detailed feedback (recorded by instructor), to student 
groups following presentation of both problem (midterm) and solution (end of term) 
analysis. Stakeholders also completed a feedback sheet, which scored each element. 
 
Findings – Group Diversity and Critical Incidents In Group Process  
These findings are organized as a time-series of critical incidents for each group, to provide a view of each group’s 
emergent design processes over time. However, as explained above, findings were compiled from multiple data 
sources and analyses, to provide triangulation. Where possible, the critical incident names use the in vivo codes that 
were common to all group members. The process and role categories are derived from the terminology employed by 
those performing these processes and roles.  
Critical Incidents For Group 1 
The least experienced group consisted of four students in their mid-twenties who had some industry background in 
systems development but at a junior level. These students were remarkably similar in their depiction of critical 
incidents during the course and presented a very coherent view of analyzing a wicked problem as a group. In the 
first half of the course, their defined critical incidents appeared to be related to understanding how to conduct the 
investigation; in the second half of the course they were strongly focused on understanding consensus and validating 
their plan for change. 
Critical Incident 1: Understanding course requirements 
Process: The group held a meeting to discuss what was required for the course and to devise a plan of action. 
Group roles: The group allocated a division of labor around interviewing various stakeholders. After each interview, 
the group convened to understand requirements in common and to identify the next stakeholder for interview. 
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Critical Incident 2: Planning questions for further inquiry 
Process: The group held a meeting 2 weeks later, to discuss what questions needed to be asked, to elicit 
requirements for change, following the initial stakeholder interviews. 
Group roles: Each group member had sub-interests within the broad problem domain. For example, one group 
member knew some of the Nursing students and offered to liaise with them, another interviewed a stakeholder who 
had presented a very technology focus to obtain more information about processes, while two group members 
collaborated in producing analytical models as the group assembled information about the situation.  
Critical Incident 3: Understanding midterm deliverables 
Process: The next stage was “to determine what work was required and how to produce this by the deadline.” 
Group roles: Group members derived a joint vision of what was to be done, then chose which processes they would 
like to work on. The processes were based on the actors involved. The group chose the actors and the tasks 
associated with the role, e.g. one member would choose teacher tasks, while someone else chose students. 
Critical Incident 4: Evaluating midterm report 
Process: Once the initial report had been produced, the group realized that they had insufficient information to 
address the scope and range of perspectives that were required. They collaborated on “evaluating” their midterm 
report, validating their perspectives with various stakeholders. 
Group roles: The group identified further stakeholders based on social network contacts they had individually made 
during the initial investigation. At this point deadlines were looming and the group satisficed their analysis: 
“If some one said something in a definitive manner other chose to follow this opinion.” 
Critical Incident 5: Determining focus for second part of course 
Process: The group chose their focus for the reduced-scope change analysis based on those human-activity systems 
that everyone understood well and the competency of various group members to analyze different processes. 
Group roles: The group took a majority vote on which areas to pursue, based on their understanding of the impact 
that could be achieved. One group member felt that their idea was dismissed as it would not have sufficient impact 
for a short-term analysis. Some members naturally took the lead on certain issues that they felt comfortable with.  
Critical Incident 6: Planning group work and validation processes for final report 
Process: The group planned their work again around a division of labor, but this time they incorporated stakeholder 
validation into their processes. Analysis models and change-elements were circulated by email and 
amended/debated by each person in detail. 
Group roles: Change-requirements analysis was now divided by stakeholder groups: the group-member responsible 
for a particular stakeholder analyzed their requirements and liaised with a stakeholder-group representative to 
validate relevant actor roles, processes, and criteria for acceptance. 
Critical Incident 7: Delivery of final report 
Process: Group report sections were annotated and commented on by email, with very few face-to-face meetings.  
Group roles: Each member was allocated a section of the report and produced an initial version of that section. All 
members read and annotated each section; changes were made by the person responsible for that section.  
Critical Incidents For Group 2 
The most experienced group consisted of four students in their early to mid-thirties who had a great deal of industry 
background in systems development and were mostly junior managers. These students were remarkably diverse in 
their analysis of the situation, but their depiction of critical incidents during the course was very similar. In the first 
half of the course, their defined critical incidents appeared to be related to understanding how to apply the SSM 
method; in the second half they were focused on dealing with perceived changes in the goals of their analysis. 
Critical Incident 1: Analyzing Initial Stakeholder Interview 
Process: With one exception, group members worked full-time, so project activities were planned by email and 
around who was available at specific times. Group members each submitted questions to whoever was available to 
conduct an interview. The group compiled a joint set of “standard” questions for stakeholder interviews. One group 
member interviewed one of the two initial project contacts. They produced an initial rich picture of the situation. 
The two software engineers in the group, who worked near to each other, conducted a second stakeholder interview. 
The group each produced sections of an initial problem-analysis report. The two software engineers produced a 
functional “software requirements” section, while another student who produced a rich picture (an SSM model). 
Group roles: The initial interviews and models were produced by anyone who was available at the time. There was 
no-one allocated to edit or merge sections, so the initial report reflected a disparate set of views. One of the software 
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engineers now took the lead. He developed the rich picture of the situation from the initial rich picture produced by 
another group member, adding new information as this emerged from interviews. The least engineering oriented 
group member produced an initial process analysis.  
Critical Incident 2: Determining The Analysis Scope 
Process: The group decided to limit their scope of analysis to PDA use in educational development and delivery. 
This was largely led by the interests of the first stakeholders to be interviewed, but also provided a way to reduce the 
complexity of an inquiry process where group members were distributed across different locations and limited in 
their availability. New problems emerged from the second set of interviews, which were developed through a rich 
picture analysis produced by one of the two software engineers. 
Group roles: Group members were confused about the soft systems method. So they divided the modeling by 
problem-analysis, so that each person could experiment with the method to understand how to analyze the situation. 
Critical Incident 3: Analyzing The Problem Situation 
Process: Group members each took a subset of the problem domain and investigated this separately, interacting by 
email with the two main contacts in the College of Nursing and contacting other relevant stakeholders by email or in 
person to address specific issues. 
Group roles: The more experienced software engineer now took charge of defining the overall problem areas and 
identifying “subsystems,” that were defined around the use of technology for various purposes. The group were still 
confused about how to apply such an unstructured (i.e. inquiry-based) analysis method to their subsystems. So they 
scheduled a meeting with the instructor, in which they produced an initial process model that integrated the four sub-
domains that they had defined for the problem-situation: (i) student technology use, (ii) educational outcomes 
assessment, (iii) instructors’ familiarity & use of technology, and (iv) technology support for instructors & students. 
Critical Incident 4: Producing The Midterm Report 
Process: Group members each took a “subsystem” and analyzed these independently. Their analyses were then 
written up in separate subsections of the midterm report and compiled together. The final report was edited and 
merged by one group member. 
Group roles: Each group member stayed with their selected domain of analysis to write subsections of the report. 
The two software engineers directed the overall content. The least engineering-oriented group member was 
responsible for merging and consistency-checking, but took a lesser role in the problem analysis. 
Critical Incident 5: Selecting The Implementation Focus 
Process: Two subsystems were selected that would be similar in their objectives (to permit student feedback about 
(i) educational objectives, and (ii) technology use and value to be collated).  
Group roles: One of the software engineers guided the selection of domains to be analyzed for the change 
management plan, based on his own interest in modeling an IT system to collate student feedback. Subsets of 
analysis were allocated to individual group members, that were defined to be relatively independent. 
Critical Incident 6: The “Transformations Fiasco” 
Process: Following a presentation in class, it became apparent that the software engineering focus of the group had 
limited the scope of their inquiry, so that they were modeling a very IT-oriented (instrumental) view of change-
management. The group met with the instructor to understand the focus of a human-activity system analysis. In 
particular, they were confused about a concept unique to some approaches to SSM, of a process “transformation.” 
This analysis explores the role and purpose of a subset of human-activity, defining the processes that are performed 
by reference to how outputs are transformed from inputs to the processes. While individual group members suffered 
a great deal of existential angst as they coped with adjusting their normative worldview of “systems analysis.” Some 
coped with this better than others. The two software engineers attempted to keep their existing focus, adjusting the 
scope of analysis to integrate IT processing more tightly. They protested at the need to “change what they were 
doing.” The two less engineering-oriented analysts continually attempted to produce new models of human-activity 
systems, only to have these rejected or revised by the two software engineers. 
Group roles: Following group discussion, each group member selected a section of the final report to work on. The 
two software engineers worked collaboratively. The two less engineering-oriented analysts worked separately on 
different subsets of the problem domain. 
Critical Incident 7: Producing The Final Report 
Process: Individuals corresponded with stakeholders via email to obtain information about sub-processes that they 
were analyzing. The group then merged their analyses and divided the report write-up according to expediency of 
completion. Many of the softer aspects of the analysis were lost at this stage. 
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Group roles: Following a face-to-face discussion, each group member selected sections of the report to complete and 
reconcile. The final report editing and merging was performed by the two software engineers. 
Critical Incidents For Group 3 
One of the two dyads worked together very cohesively. This group consisted of two students with extensive systems 
analysis and management experience, who were researching organizational issues as part of their doctoral program 
of study. However, these individuals differed from the members of other groups in that they were explicitly seeking 
a less technology-oriented approach to systems change, to fit this with organizational change. 
Critical Incident 1: Initiating The Inquiry 
Process: As they appeared to have an organization-oriented emphasis, these two students immediately focused on 
obtaining as wide a view as possible of the problem situation. Their explicit emphasis was on resisting the urge to 
over-simplify the situation, so they each produced a number of initial rich picture models, using these as boundary 
objects to explore their emerging understanding with stakeholders and with each other. 
Group roles: The two group members identified groups of relevant stakeholders and divided interviews between 
them, meeting frequently to aggregate what they had discovered.  
Critical Incident 2: Expanding The Inquiry 
Process: Because they were meeting frequently and working cohesively, the selection of appropriate systems and 
foci for analysis emerged from joint discussions. Both group members reported feeling exceptionally proud at their 
objective analysis and how effectively they reconciled multiple perspectives through debate with each other and 
with stakeholders. “We aggregated into as many logical human activity systems as possible from all the data we had, 
all the interviews we did, all the rich pictures, and that kind o f revealed to us the kind of human activity system and 
how they related to a primary goal or a bigger primary task.” 
Group roles: From the initial rich picture analysis, the two group members identified more stakeholders to be 
interviewed, analyzing each stakeholder’s perspectives as these emerged. The two group members worked very 
interactively, dividing data collection and initial analysis, but discussing their criteria for selection of appropriate 
human-activity system perspectives continually as they worked. 
Critical Incident 3: Integrating Evidence Into The Midterm Report 
Process: The midterm report became a joint boundary object allowing each individual to critique not only the 
analysis and presentation of findings from the problem investigation, but also the conceptual construction of relevant 
systems and the “logical order” of ideas that justified their analysis. This led to an exceptional rich understanding, as 
debates and disagreements advanced their joint understanding of the situation. 
Group roles: The two students collaborated about the production of a joint report, writing a section, critiquing the 
other’s analysis, reordering ideas and subsections, and debating the justification of findings, to reach a shared 
understanding of both the problem and systemic analysis.  
Critical Incident 4: Integrating Evidence Into The Midterm Report 
Process: The midterm report became a joint boundary object allowing each individual to critique not only the 
analysis and presentation of findings from the problem investigation, but also the conceptual construction of relevant 
systems and the “logical order” of ideas that justified their analysis. This led to an exceptional rich understanding, as 
debates and disagreements advanced their joint understanding of the situation. 
Group roles: The two students collaborated about the production of a joint report, writing a section, critiquing the 
other’s analysis, reordering ideas and subsections, and debating the justification of findings, to reach a shared 
understanding of both the problem and systemic analysis.  
Critical Incident 5: Post- Midterm “Scaling Up” 
Process: The group perceived a need to “scale up” their human-activity requirements in order to provide an 
implementable set of early requirements for an system of organizational process-change supported by IT. The end of 
term assignment structure then drove a focus on clarifying section deliverables.  
Group roles: One person led this initiative, producing a presentation that was critiqued by the other group member. 
Once this was produced, the two group members collaborated via email in clarifying deliverables. 
Critical Incident 6: Managing documentation of analysis between team members 
Process: The group worked collaboratively on the end of term report, “chunking” this into manageable components 
that were written by one person and developed further by the second.  
Group roles: Divide work between team members (“chunking”) by section 
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Critical Incident 7: Producing end of term report 
Process: Group work focused on producing a shared vision (a deliverable faculty research system of human-activity 
and IT support. This was modified as they worked, to include a common interest in information that was required to 
improve patient care by faculty who used the research information to improve their professional practice.  
Group roles: The report was produced through “extensive and intensive collaboration.” Team members worked on 
twelve versions of this report. 
Critical Incidents For Group 4 
The two members of the final group were both doctoral students, but one was more operationally and instrumentally 
focused than the other. The first group member (identified as GM-A below) worked as a senior IT manager. The 
second (identified as GM-B) intended to perform “socio-technical research.” There was a mismatch in expectations 
between the two, that caused some exploration of a suitable inquiry process in the first half of the course. 
Critical Incident 1: Initial inquiry 
Process: GM-B treated these stakeholder visits as an opportunity for an ethnographic study, whole GM-A treated 
them as a search for “common patterns or issues.” GM-B reported “I was bored with the generic questions we were 
asking and wanted to explore the differences.”  GM-A reported that “In the first few interviews we were completely 
lost as people kept throwing problems at us. We could not negotiate this as everyone was trying to pull us in a 
certain direction. We were not sure what to focus on.” 
Group roles: GM-A defined five deliverables to be met through interviews of stakeholders. The two group members 
jointly derived a script for their initial interviews. They set up a meeting plan that they divided between the two of 
them; as GM-A was also working for an external organization, they wanted to maximize their use of time. The two 
group members corresponded by email and met frequently to understand how to analyze the problems that were 
reported. Their deliberations centered on how to understand the SSM method. 
Critical Incident 2: Scoping The First Deliverable 
Process: The two group members worked on exploring which problems to explore. GM-A reported that “The initial 
interviews yielded a laundry list of items that people would like us to solve. This laundry list was not specific to 
anything, and we could not investigate everything. So we went back to ask where would our time be best spent. 
What could you as CNHP find useful.” 
Group roles: GM-A defined the scope of the analysis as the faculty perspective on online teaching and their use 
technology. GM-B agreed to this focus and the two of them interacted separately with a variety of stakeholders to 
investigate current processes in this area of work.  
Critical Incident 3: Exploring Granularity of Analysis 
Process: The two group members debated and worked together to decide how to analyze and model the complexity 
of information that they were receiving. This was resolved by GM-A, who attempted to apply systems analysis 
objectives to a complex problem inquiry. GM-B reported “For the first deliverable, the report, we had this issue of 
granularity … GM-A was pointing for the fine grain lower level and I was going for, I guess I saw some more 
generalized flows or something. But we went with the lower level perspective.”   
Group roles: The labor of interviewing and analysis was shared according to availability. Most of the information 
was obtained individual by email or phone. GM-B reported that “Overall we wanted the whole process to be well-
organized so that we don’t give the wrong impression to the people we were trying to reach. All the emails sent were 
copied to each one of us.”  
Critical Incident 4: Analyzing The Midterm Report 
Process: The two group members collaborated on delivering an analysis that was very functionally oriented. Their 
report merged perspectives, ignoring the requirement to reflect competing perspectives of the problems. Both group 
members reported that they collaborated in “reconciling inconsistencies” between various stakeholder perspectives. 
So student needs were lost as the faculty perspective of the main stakeholder contact was privileged.  
Group roles: Data collection was performed collectively, as the two group members attempted to follow up and 
reconcile inconsistencies between different stakeholder perspectives. The analysis of the various human-activity 
system transformations was split between the two group members, but the report was written collectively. GM-B 
reported “Working in a group was good, as I would get GM-A’s models and I would say it look so different than 
mine  –  and then we would have to articulate at an abstract level and find out what’s so different than my views of 
the world, producing this long complicated narrative.” GM-A reported, “We did not have conflicting ideas, but we 
certainly had different ideas. At first we just decided to split the work of drawing conceptual models and meet later. 
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When we met later we were shocked at how different the level of detail was. That’s when we decided on this level 
of granularity in the models.” 
Critical Incident 5: Changing Perspectives, A Social Dynamic 
Process: The two group members were asked by the instructor to rethink a part of their analysis before they 
completed the second assignment, to reflect multiple perspectives of the human-activity system, rather than various 
components of a homogeneous perspective. GM-A challenged this feedback, arguing that their approach was 
superior in delivering “business value” rather than diversity of perspective. Following instructor examples 
illustrating ways in which a diversity of perspective was valuable, the two group members attempted to make sense 
of their analysis by matching the focus displayed in the instructor examples provided. GM-A reported that their prior 
analysis appeared to be “too generic,” while GM-B reported that “we corrected some of the models and brought 
them to a different granularity.” 
Group roles: The two group members collaborated on developing their analysis in face-to-face meetings and on 
collecting more information from their two primary points of contact among the stakeholders. But the social 
dynamic of the group appeared to change. GM-B reported: “Once somebody recognizes that a prior decision was 
probably not the best one, the social including of that person, the orientation of the group changes. So for example, 
GM-A had made that argument for the lower granularity and that turned out not to be the right thing. So for the next 
decision, there was a preferred view orientation already… according to me, my idea was more comprehensive.” 
Critical Incident 6: Completing The Final Report 
Process: The two group members now followed online faculty discussions and collected more data about the focus 
of their analysis (online learning systems and technologies). Their emphasis appeared to be on an analysis of 
effectiveness, collecting statistics on usage and following up faculty problems with the technology. 
Group roles: GM-B now appeared to lead the way that the analysis focus and granularity were defined. GM-B 
reported “I did not want to make that call … it’s grounded on the history of the transaction of the group. Not on the 
logic of the ideas or augmentations.” But both group members collaborated well in producing a common analysis 
through many face-to-face meetings.  
Critical Incident 7: Presentation To Stakeholders 
Process: This group is unusual in that they separated their presentation to the two sponsoring stakeholders from their 
analysis for the final report. GM-A reported: “Since they had invested so much time with us, I really want to pay 
them back with something that was worth their time. Something they could use.” GM-B reported “I felt during our 
final presentation it was s huge struggle, for a long time we didn’t have anything to say. And whatever we say in this 
entire context, we know so little in reality and maybe we could present this in a direction that they could just say, Oh 
nice. At the end, we struck some kind of medium.” 
Group roles: The two group members worked very closely together to pull out the practical threads from their prior 
analysis. The presentation and the ideas it represented were reported as reflecting a joint vision. 
Changes In Group Inclusiveness and Collective Action Over Time 
A major element of the research focus was to explore group cohesiveness, to see if a disruption, or a breakdown to 
the initial group focus resulted in the involvement of group members in a more inclusive decision-making. Subjects 
were asked how central they felt to group decision-making and idea-generation at three points in the course (at the 
beginning, middle, and end). The results are shown in Figure 1, which shows a clear increase in the feeling of 
participant involvement in decision-making as the course processed. One person felt “uninvolved and unincluded” at 
the midterm, but this is resolved as the closure focus of the second assignment leads all four groups to involve all 
group members in defining a vision for their proposed rationale for change. If we examine the levels of group 
cohesiveness, there was some impact around the time of the breakdown in the larger groups, while the two dyads 
appeared to retain their current levels of cohesiveness. In Group 1 (the group with least experienced members), 
cohesiveness was increased as the group faced a new challenge. In Group 2, cohesiveness was reduced, as group 
agreement of what needed to be done split along expertise-domain fault-lines. 
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The second element was to explore whether a disruption, or breakdown in group focus could achieve a wider 
“requisite variety” of perspectives (Weick, 1987).  Group roles and processes were plotted for each group in Figure 
2, to determine the degree that a dominant perspective changed, from each critical incident to the next. It would 
appear that there was very little shared vision across the four groups. The most coherent group appeared to be Group 
3. With only two members, they worked collaboratively around a shared vision until the post-midterm disruption, at 
which one person revised the group focus and the group resumed a relatively collaboratively to deliver a joint 
analysis and change plan. Group 4 (the second dyad) were dominated by one group member’s “recipe for success” 
until this was found to be ill-matched to the success criteria. The social dynamic then changed to privilege the 
competing way of working suggested the second group member. The two groups of four members were very 
different. Group 1, the group with the least collective professional experience of systems analysis and project 
management,  became progressively more collaborative. They appear to have responded to the midterm disruption 
by deriving a new joint vision and then collaborating around this. In contrast, group 2, whose members had the most 
diversity of professional experience, appeared to be dominated by the two systems professionals in the group. Even 
when their collaborative vision was disrupted at the midpoint, these two individuals responded by attempting to 
carry the original vision through, then distributing planning for each of the original components to provide a more 
diverse analysis for the final deliverable. 
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Figure 2.  Collaboration vs. Individual Involvement Over The Course of The Project 
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Discussion of Findings 
Table 2 summarizes the group outcomes according to three evaluation criteria: the degree of disruption experienced 
to the group process (low, medium, or high), the complexity of the (assessed as the number of primary-tasks 
analyzed in detail for process-changes and the average activity-count for each primary-task), stakeholder evaluations 
of group’s proposed process-change and IT system solution, and instructor evaluations (both scored out of 10, with 
evaluation summary). As real-world early requirements analysis is so complex, it is difficult to provide completely 
objective evaluation measures. An analysis of participant self-reports provides indications of a major collective 
breakdown in all groups, with most groups questioning the approach that they were employing to their analysis and 
attempting to redefine this approach, as well as redefining the outputs of their design. 
Table 2.  Group Outcome Evaluation 
Group Size Degree of breakdown #  Primary-tasks & 
Ave. # Activities  
Stakeholder 
evaluation 
Instructor  
evaluation 
Group 
1 
4 Major: group assumed a “symmetry of 
ignorance” approach to solution 
requirements analysis. Disruption is 
accommodated, as group collaborates 
closely to understand new goals. 
8 3.5 8/10 
over-complex, but 
good ideas 
8/10 
in-depth change 
analysis with a few  
gaps. Well-integrated 
IT system solution 
Group 
2  
4 Major: group split along fault-lines of 
professional experience. Disruption 
causes ongoing conflict about how to 
proceed with analysis.  Group fragments 
further along occupational role fault-
lines, reducing cohesion. 
2 13 6/10 
IT solution over-
focused on one 
process (student 
feedback eval.) 
7/10 
Report fragmented. 
Detailed process-
change analysis, only 
analyzed small subset 
of IT solution  
Group 
3 
2 Major: group perceives need to change 
their approach to information-gathering, 
to explore problems further. Disruption 
is accommodated, as group views 
analysis as ongoing process of learning. 
5 8.5 10/10 
wide-ranging, highly 
integrated process 
change & IT systems 
10/10 
highly complex 
analysis of problem, 
excellent, integrated 
IT system solution 
Group 
4 
2 Major: group perceives that initial 
analysis process does not work. 
Disruption causes role reversal, as 
dominant group member defers to 
exploratory approach of other one. 
9 5.6 7 / 10 
process changes 
perceived as 
fragmented. IT 
solution helpful 
9 /10 
a highly complex 
analysis of process 
change, integrated IT 
solution with gaps 
 
From the summary of Table 2 and the group cohesiveness scores in Figure 1, it would appear that the introduction of 
a disruption in project goal-setting and analysis processes affected the four-person groups more than the two-person 
ones. The more cohesive group 1 perceived the breakdown as a challenge, responding collaboratively and increasing 
group cohesion. Group 2, which was already split on expertise-domain fault-lines, became less cohesive, with 
ongoing debate and conflict between the two subgroups about how to approach the process of change-requirements 
analysis. The two dyads appeared to cope with the breakdown more easily, possibly as group coordination was 
easier. Group 3 collaborated closely in increasing the depth of their analysis, while Group 4, which had been less 
successful in their initial analysis, reversed roles with the less experienced analyst taking the lead in defining their 
joint process. All groups achieved a successful solution, to some extent, as shown by the stakeholder and instructor 
evaluations. Each group tool a different approach to dealing with the breakdown. Group 1 assimilated the disruption, 
viewing this as one more disruption along an unfamiliar learning experience. Group 2 protested the disruption, with 
resentment from the software engineers that goals had changed, but eventually assimilated the experience by 
accepting that the SSM approach required a changing perspective. Group 3 were moved to conduct a more in-depth 
analysis, but changed course easily and became much more cohesive as a result. Group 4 were forced to change their 
approach by the combination of initial failure and change in goals. They then produced a highly integrated solution. 
The design of this study was intended to produce a collective breakdown in each group’s understanding of how to 
proceed with their IS definition (the situated, high-level design that is often referred to as “early requirements 
analysis). To ensure that the initial group focus was diverse, the study introduced a “symmetry of ignorance” into 
each group (Rittel, 1972) by using an unfamiliar, systemic method of analysis. Each group member had to learn new 
ways of working, becoming unable to call on their procedural “investments in form” (Latour, 1987; Star, 1992): the 
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work-routines, and recipes-for-success derived from their professional experience. Before the disruption to the 
project definition, the explicit process-goals communicated to students were related to the group’s exploration of the 
problem situation, separating interrelated problems out into distinct process goals and their related sets of work-
activities, and focusing on differences between the perspectives of various stakeholder groups. As Figure 2 
demonstrates, most groups engaged in a relatively collaborative approach to problem inquiry. The need to apply a 
systemic analysis approach led to a high degree of individual uncertainty, reflected in a relatively bipolar 
distribution between those group members who felt highly involved in decision-making and those who felt 
uninvolved. By the midpoint, with one exception, all participants felt relatively involved in group decision-making 
(Figure 1). Group formation theory indicates that this is to be expected, especially in conditions of high uncertainty 
(Myers and McPhee, 2006). Group dynamics theory would lead one to expect that dyads would behave more 
collaboratively than larger groups (Hare, 1981). This was not the case in Group 4, where one member called upon 
their high status professional experience to define group roles and processes. The same phenomenon was observed 
in Group 2 (a four-person group), although the effect was weaker in the larger group while the explicit assessment 
criteria rewarded a diversity of perspectives. Both groups demonstrated a split along experience-related lines, where 
one or two individuals advocated a normative process based on their prior experience to define appropriate group 
analysis processes, even when the evidence (instructor feedback) indicated that this was inappropriate. Following 
the disruption to the project definition, the process-goals were related to the group’s integration of various 
stakeholder perspectives, to produce a coherent set of requirements for both business process and IT system change 
– i.e. an integrationist (as distinct from reductionist) form of problem closure. In response to tight deadlines, each 
group engaged in a much more distributed way of working, where they often called upon the prior expertise of one 
or two group members to provide a way to deal with the high uncertainty that this disruption introduced. These 
different approaches are summarized in Table 2 and appear to be related to two variables: the group size and the 
degree to which groups were split along domain-expertise lines. Although these findings are exploratory, with a 
small number of groups, smaller groups appear to be more adaptive following a major breakdown. Where there was 
a split between group members who lacked extensive software engineering expertise and those who possessed such 
expertise, the software engineers claimed a superiority of knowledge, using this claim to manage the division of 
labor, thus controlling group roles and the definition of group processes. 
Conclusions 
The study provides a detailed view of the different ways in which a procedural “investment in form” (Latour, 1987; 
Star, 1992) is constructed in newly-formed groups that are thrown into a complex, boundary-spanning problem-
situation. It illustrates how collaborative groups construct structures of action when uncertainty is high and time 
constraints are tight. The findings demonstrate how experienced IS professionals call upon existing recipes for 
success in such circumstances, outweighing considerations of flexibility and adaptiveness, even when these 
attributes of a solution are explicitly rewarded. Experienced IS professionals appear to respond to the high levels of 
uncertainty that this introduces by calling upon the authority of their technical domain analysis expertise to control 
the division of labor, which in turn establishes structural role-definitions for individuals within the group. This 
finding confirms the finding of a previous field study of design in groups involving technical and non-technical 
areas of expertise (Gasson, 1999).  
Although this is an exploratory study, conducted with a small number of participants, it provides rich insights into 
processes that are largely unobserved, except in controlled experiments which do not mirror real-world settings. We 
know little about how IS professionals, who are constantly assigned to new projects, with new people, adapt their 
practices in conditions of high uncertainty and “thrownness” (Weick, 2004).  The role of collective breakdowns in 
design appears to hold promise only if we can manage the automaticity in analysis that is provided by existing 
procedural investments in form. This may be possible if we can locate some way to challenge the engineering 
“thought-rails” that dominate some aspects of our profession meaningfully. Time constraints and the need to manage 
uncertainty appear to override the need for effective, wide-ranging solutions. This can be managed with active 
intervention from a process expert (as it was here, employing instructor feedback). But where individuals have a 
strong engineering orientation, or a high-status IS management background, they may be so used to applying 
procedural investments-in-form that it may be difficult to disrupt this automaticity, even when the reward structure 
is designed to penalize reductionism. The contribution of this paper is to suggest a mechanism for introducing 
productive, collective breakdowns into boundary-spanning systems definition and to demonstrate the mechanisms 
that permit this to be successful or to fail. Two variables appear to be important in managing group response to 
breakdowns: group size and the degree to which groups were split along domain-expertise lines. Further studies will 
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examine the impact of managing these variables, or structuring outcome evaluation criteria in different ways, to 
reward diversity and process improvisation to obtain an understanding of how to improve the processes that we 
employ for early requirements analysis of boundary-spanning information systems. 
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